There are hardware for that called hardware security modules, but yeah I definitely wouldn’t trust Twitter’s implementation - especially because they probably just need the auth team to tell the HSM that the user logged in when they didn’t to get that key
So again - you’re just hoping that they’ve done it wrong, based on nothing other than you wanting them to have done it wrong. They’ve told you they did, but you don’t believe them based on…nothing…nothing whatsoever…other than your hatred.
Feel free to tell me how your knowledge of cryptography proves that it’s done incorrectly though. Please.
You’re choosing to pretend it’s nothing so you can dismiss legitimate criticism.
An engineer hearing about some novice trying to build a plane using difficult methods that only one or two companies with immense expertise has succeeded at would be correct to assume that plane would be unsafe.
A doctor hearing about a tiny clinic attempting treatments that only big medical research facilities have pulled off are correct to assume they’re charlatans.
A cryptographer hearing about somebody attempting to build E2EE using methods that very few are capable of implementing correctly and without having the expertise on hand are correct to call that snakeoil.
Cryptography is INFAMOUSLY complex. E2EE is infamously difficult to make easy (“Johnny still can’t encrypt”). The worst part is that cryptographic failures are almost always 100% silent!
There’s a reason almost everybody copies Signal’s protocol, and that everybody else who does it in-house keeps having vulnerabilities.
Multi user key management (PKI) specifically is wildly complex.
They’re doing cryptography in the browser - famously difficult to make it work decently because there’s no reliable code pinning solution, no reliable protected key storage (no TPM protected keystore) and absolutely no auditability. And that’s on top of the risk of getting served malicious Javascript via XSS attacks, or by the host getting hacked, or by a maliciously issued certificate (there’s 800+ certificate authorities, FYI, no cert pinning = easy for a state level actor to MITM)
They’re not doing transparency logs of user keys. Even whatsapp has started doing that.
I haven’t seen evidence of them attempting user key verification
Twitter/X has only displayed signs of LACKING the necessary expertise.
To pretend that’s wishful thinking from me just reveals how little you care about expertise.
You’re questioning experts with absolutely no justification other than your own animosity, assuming the experts too are driven by animosity instead of true concerns
If you can’t demonstrate that you know more about cryptography then me, it’s time for you to admit you’re wrong
You said this
So again - you’re just hoping that they’ve done it wrong, based on nothing other than you wanting them to have done it wrong. They’ve told you they did, but you don’t believe them based on…nothing…nothing whatsoever…other than your hatred.
Feel free to tell me how your knowledge of cryptography proves that it’s done incorrectly though. Please.
This is incoherent bullshit.
You’re choosing to pretend it’s nothing so you can dismiss legitimate criticism.
An engineer hearing about some novice trying to build a plane using difficult methods that only one or two companies with immense expertise has succeeded at would be correct to assume that plane would be unsafe.
A doctor hearing about a tiny clinic attempting treatments that only big medical research facilities have pulled off are correct to assume they’re charlatans.
A cryptographer hearing about somebody attempting to build E2EE using methods that very few are capable of implementing correctly and without having the expertise on hand are correct to call that snakeoil.
Cryptography is INFAMOUSLY complex. E2EE is infamously difficult to make easy (“Johnny still can’t encrypt”). The worst part is that cryptographic failures are almost always 100% silent!
There’s a reason almost everybody copies Signal’s protocol, and that everybody else who does it in-house keeps having vulnerabilities.
Multi user key management (PKI) specifically is wildly complex.
They’re doing cryptography in the browser - famously difficult to make it work decently because there’s no reliable code pinning solution, no reliable protected key storage (no TPM protected keystore) and absolutely no auditability. And that’s on top of the risk of getting served malicious Javascript via XSS attacks, or by the host getting hacked, or by a maliciously issued certificate (there’s 800+ certificate authorities, FYI, no cert pinning = easy for a state level actor to MITM)
They’re not doing transparency logs of user keys. Even whatsapp has started doing that.
I haven’t seen evidence of them attempting user key verification
Twitter/X has only displayed signs of LACKING the necessary expertise.
To pretend that’s wishful thinking from me just reveals how little you care about expertise.
You have seen nothing to say that they aren’t doing it correctly, or that the employee who confirmed that they are doing it correctly lied.
You’re literally just full of copium and hopium because you hate Elon.
Again, you sound like an antivaxxer, and you’re ignoring his history of failure, including SPECIFICALLY FAILING AT ENCRYPTED DM BEFORE
https://www.theverge.com/2023/5/16/23725247/twitter-encrypted-dm-security-vulnerabilities-linda-yaccarino
You’re questioning experts with absolutely no justification other than your own animosity, assuming the experts too are driven by animosity instead of true concerns